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After the catastrophes of the first months of the war, Russia’s military commanders hoped 
that the coming of autumn in 1914 would bring a respite from intense fighting. Colder 
weather and short days would make military operations a more difficult prospect for both 
sides and for the organisations founded to care for the wounded, the war's first winter should 
provide a calmer period. When Prince G. E. L'vov, the union’s chairman, spoke at a meeting 
of the Union of Zemstvo on 15 October 1914, he believed that he had seen some signs of 
hope in the military situation, as he noted that 'the dark clouds that had blown in from the 
west over the last two and a half months were now clearing and that rays of sunlight were 
beginning to appear'.1 The apparent easing of  the severity of military operations would 
provide an opportunity for the unions to stabilise their work and to develop a framework for 
their activity without the pressure of military crisis requiring immediate responses.  
 
This article will discuss how the Union of Zemstvo and the Union of Towns adapted to the 
military situation that developed after the defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in 
August and September 1914. It will analyse how, after the initial panic and chaos of the first 
weeks and months of the war, these public organisations were able to extend the scope of 
their activities and to embed their work deeply into the fabric of Russia’s wartime society. 
Immediately war was declared in summer 1914, Russia’s elected local government 
institutions – the provincial and district zemstva and municipal councils – recognised that 
they could play an important part in supporting the Russian war effort. Half a century of 
experience organising local services had convinced Russia’s local government institutions 
that they had the capacity to make a substantial contribution to the war effort, and the role 
that local government had played during the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05 - when they had 
provided care for the wounded – reinforced this belief. Russia’s military very quickly showed 
itself unable to deal with the tens of thousands of men who were wounded in the battles in the 
first weeks of the war, and the zemstva and municipal councils quickly stepped in to organise 
the evacuation of men away from the battlefield and to establish hospitals to provide medical 
care for Russia’s wounded.2  
 
Russia’s experience of the First World War has become the subject of serious study in its 
own right in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the centenary of the outbreak of 
the war in 2014 prompted the appearance of much academic work. Alongside major studies 
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of the war itself,3 there have been significant studies of national wartime politics,4 as well as 
detailed analyses of individual topics.5 Substantial documentary collections have appeared, 
encompassing many different aspects of the war.6 The work of Russia’s local government 
institutions during the war was first discussed in two volumes in the Carnegie series on the 
history of the war, published a decade after the end of the conflict.7 More recent studies, 
notably A. S. Tumanova’s 2014 book,  have utilised Russia’s archives and provided detailed 
discussion of the role of public organisations between 1914 and 1917.8 Tumanova argues that 
the Russian government failed to capitalise on the initial goodwill shown by Russia’s civic 
society in the first months of the war, and failed to recognise the changed nature of Russian 
society. Her work pays less attention to the wide-ranging work carried out on the ground by 
public organisations and how their strength developed quickly after the outbreak of war. 
 
The unions themselves published considerable materials during the war that described their 
activities and brought them to the attention of a wider public. It was important for the unions 
to promote communcation between the many different local organisations that were 
participating in the broader national movement that was directed from the unions’ 
headquarters in Moscow, as well as to stimulate engagement by local bodies in the work of 
the national unions. The reluctance of central government to permit frequent national 
meetings of representatives of the zemstva and municipal councils made it especially 
important for the unions to ensure that local organisations were kept closely informed of the 
empire-wide work that was taking place under the auspices of the national unions. As well as 
regular reports on the work of the unions,9 both bodies published journals, fortnightly in the 
case of the Union of Zemstvo, that provided up to date information about their work and 
allowed the union’s leadership to communicate with local bodies. The Izvestiia glavnogo 
komiteta published in 58 issues by the Union of Zemstvo from October 1914 until March 
1917 represent an especially valuable source for the study of the place of social organisations 
in the fabric of Russian society during the war. The first issue of the Izvestiia, published on 
15 October 1914, gives a flavour of the range of topics that the journal was to cover in 
coming months and years. A long introduction setting out the genesis of the organisation 
included news of private financial contributions to the union’s work, as well as noting the 
involvement of the imperial family in the beginnings of the union’s work. The issue of state 
funding of the union was set out in some detail, and information provided about the numbers 
of wounded that would need care.  The journal reported that the first zemstvo hospital train 
had departed from Moscow for Nizhnii Novgorod on 15 August and included detailed 
material relating to the location of zemstvo-organised feeding stations for the wounded and 
the provision of stores to ensure that hospital trains could be properly supplied.10 Rarely 
 
3 O. R. Airapetov, Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine, 4 vols., Moscow, 2014-15 is the most 
comprehensive study. 
4 See Pervaia mirovaia voina i konets Rossiiskoi imperii, 2 vols, St Petersburg, 2014. 
5 For example, N. V. Surzhikova, Voennyi plen v rossiiskoi provintsii (1914-1922gg.), Moscow, 2014. 
6 Pervaia mirovaia voina v otsenke sovremmikov: vlast’ i rossiiskoe obshchestvo. 1914-1918, 4 vols., Moscow, 
2014, provides a comprehensive set of political and social opinions. Pervaia mirovia voina 1914-1918 gg. v 
dnevnikakh i vospominaniiakh ofitserov Russkoi imperatorskoi armii, Moscow, 2016 and Fridrikh Krauze, 
Pis’ma s pervoi mirovoi, St Petersburg, 2017 provide individual testimonies. 
7 Tikhon J. Polner, Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos, New Haven CT, 
1930 and Paul P. Gronsky and Nicholas J. Astrov, The War and the Russian Government, New Haven CT, 
1929. 
8 A. S. Tumanova, Obshchestvennye organisatsii Rossii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914-fevral' 1917 g.), 
Moscow, 2014.  
9 See, for example, Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi bol’nym i ranenym voinam. Obzor deialtel’nosti 
glavnogo komiteta, 1 avgusta 1914g. – 1 fevralia 1915 g., Moscow, 1915. 
10 Izvestiia, no 1, 15 October 1914, pp. 1-42. 
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utilised in depth by writers on Russia’s experience of the First World War, the Izvestiia 
glavnogo komiteta provide a uniquely valuable source for the study of social engagement 
witrh the war effort. 
 
By the beginning of 1915, the unions had been able to equip more than 160,000 hospital beds 
for the wounded, including over 26,000 at the front itself. In addition, at the request of the 
Ministry of War, the Union of Zemstvo equipped evacuation hospitals in nine regional 
centres: Penza, Poltava, Orel, Khar’kov, Rostov, Kaluga, Tambov and Nizhnii Novgorod. 
The provision and operation of hospital trains was a central part of the unions' work, and after 
five months of war, it had succeeded in equipping forty trains. Initially, the trains had been 
intended just to operate in the interior of Russia, transporting the wounded from evacuation 
points to provincial towns and cities, but soon after the outbreak of hostilities the war 
ministry asked that the trains be used for bringing casualties away from the front with thirty 
of them running to and from the centres of battle in East Prussia and Galicia by the end of 
1914. The unions also sent detachments to the front to assist in providing medical care and 
food to the wounded while they were being transported from an initial first aid point to a 
hospital train, and plans were being drawn up to open hospitals with 80 to 100 beds at 
railway stations close to the front to care for seriously wounded troops who could not be 
safely moved further.11  
 
Imperial and popular reaction 
 
The imperial family showed immediate approval for the work of the two unions. Prince 
L’vov, elected as the chairman of the Union of Zemstvo in July 1914, met Nicholas II on 6 
August  and received the Tsar’s good wishes for the zemstva’s work with the wounded. 
Members of the imperial family visited zemstvo warehouses the following day. The Tsarist 
government had shown extreme reluctance to allow the zemstva and municipal councils to 
form nationwide organisations in the decades since their initial establishment under 
Alexander II in the 1860s and 1870s, and Nicholas II’s overt approbation for the newly 
founded organisation was vital in enabling Russia’s local government institutions to form 
national bodies. Less than a week after Lvov’s meeting with the Tsar, the government gave 
its formal approval to the establishment of the Union of Zemstvo for Aid to Sick and 
Wounded Troops. The imperial family continued to demonstrate its support for the new 
organisation: on 20 November 1914, Nicholas II visited the Union’s hospital in Smolensk, 
and during December the Tsar, his wife and their children inspected the Union’s 7th front-line 
medical detachment at Khodynka in Moscow immediately before it was despatched to the 
Caucasus on active duty and also visited a hospital that had been set up in the Petrovskii 
palace.12 This was followed by the Tsar receiving a delegation from the Union of Zemstva 
and hearing a report on the Union’s work during the four months of war.13 A reception in the 
Moscow Kremlin in the presence of the Tsar was then held for organisations providing aid to 
Russia’s troops,14 and  in late January 1915, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the 
Commander-in-Chief, together with his whole staff, visited a zemstvo hospital.15 
 
 
 
11 Izvestiia, no. 6-7, 1-15 January 1915, p. 6. 
12 Dnevniki imperatora Nikolaiia II 1894-1918, t. II, ch. 2, 1914-1918, Moscow, 2013, p. 80. 
13 Vserossiiskii zemskii soiuz pomoshchi bol’nym i ranenym voinam, Sobranie Upolnomochennykh gubernskikh 
zemstv v Moskve 12-13 marta 1915 g. Zhurnaly zasedanii (Sobranie), Moscow 1915, p. 3. 
14 Izvestiia, no. 5, 15 December 1914, pp. 1-2. 
15 Izvestiia, no. 8, 1 February 1915, p. 54. 
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Early in March 1915, the Union received further confirmation of the emperor’s approval of 
its work in a telegram from Prince Alexander Ol’denburgskii, the head of the army’s health 
and evacuation department, who expressed the Tsar’s thanks for the Union’s work to combat 
epidemic disease and promised to provide the necessary funds to continue the work.16 At the 
end of the month, L’vov again met Nicholas II at Tsarskoe Selo and presented a detailed 
report on the Union’s work, stressing the role of the organisation in taking action to deal with 
infectious diseases and emphasising the readiness of the Union to take on the task.17 The 
‘sacred unity’ that swept through Russian society during the first months of the war saw the 
Tsar and the local government organisations embracing each other to support Russia’s war 
effort. Despite the government’s suspicion of allowing the formation of a national 
organisation of local government institutions, Nicholas II was prepared to encourage and 
engage strongly with the new unions and their leaders. Even though elements in the 
government retained a deep scepticism of the local government organisations,18 it was 
important for the regime to recognise that they were making a vital contribution to the war 
effort. 
 
The defeats of the first weeks and months of the war resulted in more than 200,000 Russian 
casualties, along with 100,000 men killed. The war ministry proved incapable of coping with 
the task of caring for the wounded and, very quickly, the Union of Zemstva and Union of 
Towns stepped in to equip and run hospital trains to evacuate wounded men away from the 
battlefront, established hospitals and provided medical care for Russia’s soldiers and, as the 
war continued, they began to provide a variety of supplies to the troops. The response to the 
unions’ efforts from the soldiers whom it assisted was enthusiastic and demonstrated their 
appreciation of the work of the two organisations. Speaking at a meeting of the Union of 
Zemstva in mid-October 1914, L’vov declared that ‘we can now be calm about the wounded. 
The feelings of pain and alarm for them have now been replaced by the confidence that every 
wounded soldier returning from the field of battle will find here, at home, in the heart of the 
empire, a peaceful bed, fraternal care and treatment’.19 His optimism was encouraged by the 
popular enthusiasm for providing assistance to Russia’s fighting men: there were substantial 
donations of goods for the army from the general population. By the middle of November 
1914, the Union of Zemstva had been able to despatch 460 boxes of material, including 
tobacco, to its Warsaw warehouse for distribution to the frontline, while groups of Moscow 
students set up a cooperative to sell evening newspapers on the streets of the city and donate 
the profits to the Union of Zemstva.20  
 
While the imperial family showed approbation for the work of the unions, the attitude of the 
government was much less supportive. The Tsarist regime had, since the establishment of the 
zemstva and municipal councils in the regirn of Alexander II, firmly resisted any attempt by 
the local govermnent institutions to establish any sort of national organisation to provide 
unity across the empire. It had only been at times of grave emergency that any form of united 
action by Russia's local government institutions had been permitted: the Volga famine of the 
early 1890s and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 were the only real occasions when the 
state had permitted concerted action by the zemstva.21 For the St Petersburg regime, local 
 
16 Sobranie, p. 3. 
17 Izvestiia, no. 12-13, 1-15 April 1915, p. 1. 
18 F. A. Gaida, Vlast’ i obshchestvennost’ v Rossii: dialog o puti politicheskogo razvitiia (1910-1917), Moscow, 
2016, pp. 380-1. 
19 Izvestiia, no. 2, 1  November 1914, p. 88. 
20 Izvestiia, no. 3, 15 November 1914, p. 27. 
21 T. I. Polner, Obshchezemskaia organizatsiia na Dal'nem Vostoke, vol. 1, Moscow, 1908, pp. 5-15. 
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government should remain local and must not seek to trespass on the functions and 
competence of national bodies. Caught unawares by the severity of military defeat in the first 
weeks and months of war in 1914, the regime had no choice but to allow the zemstva and 
municipal councils to unite and organise centrally, but the government was insistent that 
these national organisations could only exist for the duration of the war. 22 Reflecting in 
autumn 1915 on the experience of the unions’ interactions with the goverment, L’vov noted 
that it was deeply regrettable that those at the head of the government had proved unable of 
living up to the great responsibility laid upon them. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 
particular, had persistently placed obstacles in the way of the unions working together to 
combat the threat of infectious disease.23 As political tensions intensified during the autumn 
of 1915, relations between government and the unions deteriorated even further, with General 
Mrozovskii, the commander of the Moscow military district, attempting to prevent the 
holding of meetings of both unions, and even charcterising the zemstvo union as an 
‘unlegalised organisation’.24 The attitude of the national government to the unions was to 
continue to be suspicious and wary. 
 
As the unions began to supply Russia’s frontline troops with a wide variety of material, 
soldiers and their officers wrote to express their gratitude for the work of the unions in 
supporting the war effort. The commander of the 1st company of the 209th Bogordskii 
infantry regiment wrote on 6 December 1914 to thank the Union of Zemstva for its gifts, 
especially warm clothing, that his men had received, and emphasising how important it was 
for his troops to know that their motherland had them in its thoughts and was trying to ease 
the difficulties of military life.25 Other detachments also wrote to express their thanks to the 
unions for sending warm clothing: a unit on the north western front wrote that life in the 
trenches meant rain, sleet and water everywhere, but after receiving parcels from the Union 
of Zemstva ‘now things are going well, every soldier is cheerful’.26 The regular soldiers of the 
151st Piatigorsk regiment wrote on 15 December 1914 to thank the union for its gift of fresh 
underwear which had arrived late the previous day so that ‘we had last night free of being 
bitten by insects’.27 The commander of a reserve battalion wrote to thank the union for its 
provision of footwear and tobacco, which had been enough to supply 2,000 men and leave 
some material over for the next contingent of troops. The Bogorodskii regiment’s soldiers 
wrote again on 20 December offering their gratitude for the union’s supplies that had reached 
every man in the regiment 
 
‘We received them gladly and shared them out between us: everyone said that they would 
now be able to keep warm in the trenches, and not need to run about to keep warm. Tea with 
sugar gives us pleasure and warms our stomachs, empty from days of sitting in the trenches. 
Every soldier in the trenches longs for a kettle or pan so that they can make tea and quench 
their thirst. Tobacco and cigarettes we consider a luxury...and even non-smoking soldiers 
who receive them, light up and then - coughing and grimacing from the unaccustomed smoke 
-  say that it makes the long dull hours pass more quickly’.28 
 
 
22 'Osobyi zhurnal soveta ministrov, 25 noiabria 1914 goda', Osobye zhurnaly Soveta ministrov Rossiiskoi 
imperii. 1914 god., Moscow, 2006, pp. 545-6. 
23 Moscow, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 12564, op. 1, d. 8, l. 205. 
24 RGVIA, f. 12564, op.1, d. 9, l. 2. 
25 Izvestiia, no. 5, 15 December 1914, p. 56-7. 
26 Izvestiia, no. 6-7, 1-15 January 1915, p. 73. 
27 Ibid., p. 74. 
28 Ibid., p. 77. 
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A further letter, signed by 102 men from an unidentified detachment, thanked the union for 
the presents it had sent for Christmas and the New Year 
 
‘These presents for the holidays so gladdened us that there are no words to express our 
gratitude. Your attention has touched us to the depth of our souls and produced involuntary 
tears. We had thought that we had been forgotten, but no – happiness touched us and made us 
realise that people are thinking about us and caring for us. This is the most important thing 
for us’.29 
 
Many of the ordinary soldiers in Russia’s army could not read and write, and commanding 
officers often wrote on their behalf: there were especial thanks from officers to the unions for 
providing warm clothing and new underwear for the men under their command. 30 A group of 
soldiers – both officers and ordinary troops – wrote after being treated on hospital train no. 
208 to thank the zemstva union, expressing especial gratitude for the atmosphere, care and 
food on the train as it carried them away from the battlefront. Soldiers from the 13th troop of 
the 47th Siberian artillery regiment wrote that they were touched by the generosity of the 
zemstva: ‘Now we are convinced that people living in Russia care more about us then we do 
about ourselves’.31 Not all Russian troops were illiterate: a young soldier, Vasilii Khirnyi, 
wrote a diary about his experience of being wounded and evacuated from the south western 
front and then transferred to a zemstvo hospital in Tarnov during January and February 1915, 
expressing his thanks to the Union of Zemstvo for its work and, especially, to the medical 
assistant and nurse who looked after him while he was in hospital.32  Khirnyi was especially 
touched when the nurse marked his name-day with gifts – white bread, cigarettes and 
matches, soap and, particularly valuable for him, a notebook and pencil: ‘I was overcome’ he 
wrote ‘and did not how to respond to such generosity...The soldiers in the hospital ward 
talked all day about the nurse and each valued her dignity...Every soldier who was in the 
hospital run by the second detachment of the All Russian Union of Zemstvo will remember it 
and its staff’.33  
 
Other soldiers too wrote to the Union expressing their thanks for the care they had received 
on hospital trains: wounded soldiers on train no. 200 evacuating them to Gomel’ commented 
on the train’s cleanliness and on the quality of the food, giving special praise to the work of 
the doctors and nurses. They were particularly appreciative that, when one of the soldiers 
began to bleed profusely from one of his wounds, the train was stopped to allow the medical 
staff to attend to him.34 A wounded soldier arriving at a zemstvo hospital in Mogilev wrote to 
L’vov that ‘you took care of us as if we were your own children...there are mothers who are 
less caring with their children...Wherever I am, be it at home or again at the front, I will 
always remember your care and solicitude for us wounded men. I wish you, you excellency, 
and the whole Union, long life and that your work will always be remembered’.35 A junior 
officer wrote to one of the nurses who had treated him at the Mogilev hospital to thank her 
for the prayers and hymns that had accompanied both his arrival and departure from the 
hospital, while letters from soldiers still in the trenches showed how much they appreciated 
the work of the zemstvo union. One solider wrote that he was sitting in a trench in a position 
 
29 Izvestiia, no. 8, 1 February 1915, p. 72. 
30 Ibid., p. 63. 
31 Izvestiia, no. 9, 15 February 1915, p. 61. 
32 Izvestiia, no. 12-13, 1-15 April 1915, p. 79. 
33 Ibid., p. 82. 
34 Izvestiia, no. 1 June 1915, p. 43. 
35 Ibid., p. 44. 
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where ‘the only thing between us and the enemy is a river...I am emboldened to write and 
send you my sincere thanks for your work and cordiality towards us, poor wounded soldiers. 
I can never forget all you did, and my conscience does not allow me to put off any longer 
thanking you for how you cared for us, such good and kind parents to your children. We 
arrived filthy, ragged and grime-blackened from sitting in the trenches, and you paid no 
attention to the dirt, but turned us into clean and calm soldiers. Thanks to your work and help, 
almost all the wounded have now returned to active service with our valiant troops and our 
brothers in the defence of our mother Russia’.36  
 
The work of the frontline detachments of the unions was given substantial praise by soldiers 
who had benefitted from their work. The commander of a military unit operating on the south 
western front in Galicia close to the rivers Dunajec and San wrote approvingly of the work of 
a zemstvo detachment, headed by V.V. Romeikov, which had worked very hard to evacuate 
the wounded. The commander wrote how he had witnessed ‘the boundless energy of the 
staff, and the care and tenderness with which they treated the sick and wounded’ and noted to 
Prince L’vov how the detachment had left a wonderful memory among all the troops under 
his command.37 The commander of an infantry division wrote to L’vov that one of his 
regiments had been involved in hard fighting for two weeks and that, once the leader of the 
5th zemstvo union detachment had learned of the scale of the casualties, he organised a special 
medical unit and ‘for two weeks [the unit] worked continuously under very heavy artillery 
fire to selflessly assist the regiment with first aid and moving casualties, so that the work of 
evacuation was carried out without delay...I have recommended the entire staff of the unit for 
a St George’s decoration’.38  
 
For Russia’s soldiers, the work of the two unions interposed a different tone into their 
military service. The first months of the war were very difficult for the Russian army as 
hundreds of thousands of men were killed and wounded, and the care provided by the local 
government organisations contrasted sharply with the often chaotic scenes on the battlefront 
where the war ministry experienced extreme difficulties in organising effective medical 
treatment and evacuating the wounded to the rear. The letters sent by ordinary soldiers and 
their commanders to the Union of Zemstva national headquarters show how much they 
valued the way in which the unions’ staff treated them as members of a family: ‘tenderness’ 
is a frequent element in the description of the attitude of the unions to the wounded. The 
contrast with the often harsh discipline of the army itself, and the brutal and distressing 
experiences that soldiers experienced as the army was repeatedly defeated in the summer and 
autumn of 1914, was immense and gave wounded men some respite from the hard life they 
endured at the battlefront. The gifts of warm clothing, along with simple pleasure-giving 
items such as tobacco and tea, ensured that soldiers gained a very different impression from 
their interaction with the unions: the army had shown itself clearly incapable of ensuring that 
its fighting men were properly equipped and provisioned. 
 
The response of ordinary soldiers to the work of medical staff and, in particular, nurses, was 
not always wholly positive. While the work of authentic nurses was given great praise in 
reporting of their work in caring for the wounded, there were sometimes less complimentary 
judgements on the motivations for women wishing to work as nurses. Occasional newspaper 
reports suggested that women were becoming nurses to make it easier for them to find a 
 
36 Izvestiia, 1 June 1915, p. 45. 
37 Izvestiia, no. 15, 15 May 1915, p. 29. 
38 Ibid. 
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husband,39 while there were also examples of salacious images being circulated depicting 
nurses. As the war progressed, these latter were especially directed towards the Empress and 
her daughters, and suggested more general anxiety about female roles in the masculine 
environment of the military.40 
 
 
Local government and the Russian state 
 
While L’vov had hoped in mid-October 1914 that there were signs of recovery in Russia’s 
military position, the progress that Russia had made by preventing further German and 
Austro-Hungarian advances into Poland did not lead to any sustained improvement in the 
situation.41 By the start of December, L’vov was writing that the task facing Russia’s troops 
was on a different scale from previous conflicts and that the news from the front showed the 
‘exceptional resilience’ of the army. He expressed the hope that the pressure on the military 
would ease, but acknowledged the need to be ready to provide aid to the troops in readiness 
for cold weather.42 During the autumn and first winter of the war, Russia avoided defeats of 
the magnitude of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes and its armies enjoyed success against 
Austria-Hungary with the capture of L’viv in September, and the long siege of the Galician 
fortress of Przemysl through the winter that ended, after more than 130 days, with Austrian 
capitulation in March 1915. But, at the start of May 1915, the German army launched an 
offensive in western Galicia, south of the city of Krakow. The Russian army found itself in 
increasing disarray and its position rapidly weakened. The respite from defeat and its 
associated casualties that L’vov and the two unions hoped for had proved to be of short 
duration. 
 
As the war developed, the zemstva and municipal councils showed substantial confidence in 
their competence, believing that the roots of their abilities lay in their 50 years of service in 
Russia’s provinces and cities. Speaking on 12 March 1915, L’vov declared that  
 
‘the great ideas of the great transformer of Russian life, the unforgettable emperor Alexander 
II, the great ideals incorporated by their creator in the zemstvo institutions, through which we 
have gained an upbringing in the ways of the state, have borne fruit. At a moment of the 
greatest historical adversity, the Russian people have shown themselves, thanks to the 
institutions of the zemstva, sufficiently organised to endure the hard blows of fate and to meet 
them, not in a state of disunity and uncoordination, but with united force, as structured and 
ordered as the army at the front’.43  
 
The experience that the zemstva had gained in their 50 years of work was, for L’vov, an 
essential preparation for their wartime work. The zemstvo saw their involvement in the war 
effort in 1914 as representing the natural culmination of their decades of experience 
governing Russia’s cities and provinces. The role that the zemstvo could play, they argued, 
was a vital component in cementing the national unity that was needed for the successful 
prosecution of the war and the institutions of local government. 
 
39 Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, Mobilizing the Russian Nation. Patriotism and Citizenship in the First World 
War, Cambridge 2016, p. 126. 
40 Boris I. Kolonitskii, ‘Obraz sestry miloserdii’ in Katia Bruish and Nikolau Katser, Bol’shaia voina Rossii, St 
Petersburg 2014, pp. 100-26. 
41 Sergei Nelipovich, Krovavyi oktiabr’ 1914 goda, Moscow, 2013, pp. 276-91. 
42 Izvestiia, no. 5, 1 December 1914, p. 1. 
43 Sobranie, p. 8. 
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‘The work of government has given us accumulated experience and strength’, L’vov 
continued, ‘and we should remember that, the as we become more experienced, older and 
mature, the more demands history will place upon us. But we should not fear these demands 
and responsibilities. The solution to all our historical tasks lies in the unity of the spiritual 
strengths of the country. And with the unity of the Tsar and people, with which we are 
experiencing these present momentous days, Russia has nothing to fear’.  
 
The zemstva’s work in providing aid for Russia’s wounded was the practical embodiment of 
the unity between state and society that was vital for victory. L’vov declared that 
 
‘it is frightening to think what would happen if there were no zemstva. We can now proudly 
declare that we have assisted our valiant army, organising affairs deep in the rear, providing 
our sick and wounded troops with necessary transport and care, and thus supporting good 
spirits in the country. The mood of the people is the central guarantee of eventual victory’.44  
 
By 1914, Russia’s local government institutions saw themselves as being integral elements in 
Russia’s state structures, but they believed that they were more than just cogs in the 
administrative machine: the zemstva and municipal councils held a special place in the ethos 
of the state since they were elected by the Russian people. Before 1905, these institutions of 
local government were the only bodies in the entire Russian state structure that could claim 
popular legitimacy through election, albeit on a very limited franchise.45 This gave them a 
particular ability to claim that they had insight into the mentality and aspirations of Russians 
as a whole, and the local government institutions believed that they formed a vital bridge 
between the state and its population. In January 1915, the Perm provincial zemstvo wrote to 
L’vov, declaring that the zemstvo work to assist the wounded ‘again eloquently demonstrates 
the historical vitality of the zemstvo base to the state’s structure’.46 No other organisation in 
the Russian empire could claim to have the same level of day-to-day contact with the 
ordinary people of the empire, and to operate not, as the masters of the population, but as its 
elected representatives. Even after the introduction of the nationally elected Duma in 1905, 
the zemstva and municipal councils remained uniquely close to the everyday needs of the 
Russian population, providing schooling, health care, agricultural advice and a host of other 
basic services.  
 
Ever since their establishment during Alexander II’s reign, local government institutions had 
believed that they should act as the base on which the principle of popular participation in 
government could be extended to the national level. Successive generations of zemstvo and 
municipal council members had made the case for some form of elected national assembly, 
and the campaigns during 1904 and 1905 for national popular representation had zemstvo and 
municipal council members at their heart.47 The Tsarist regime resisted all attempts by local 
government organisations to form any sort of national body but, during the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-1905, local government organisations were able to act in a concerted way to 
provide assistance to the wounded.48 They were unable, however, to sustain their national 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Kermit E. Mackenzie, ‘Zemstvo organization and role within the administrative structure’, in Terence 
Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), The zemstvo in Russia. An experiment in local self-government 
Cambridge, 1982, pp. 31-78. 
46 Izvestiia, no. 8, 1 February 1915, p. 55. 
47 Shmuel Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900-1905, Cambridge, 1973, esp. pp. 109-76. 
48 Moscow, Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskvy (TsGAM), f. 179, op. 60, d. 791, l. 34. 
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role beyond the end of the war, but the experience gained in Russia’s Far East was significant 
in enabling local government to organise itself rapidly when war broke out in summer 1914 
and the zemstvo and municipal councils saw the war as providing a political opportunity for 
them. Writing at the beginning of March 1915, L’vov declared that 
 
‘when the blessed day of victory arrives for our motherland, when all our national forces can 
be devoted to peaceful, creative work and cultural construction, a wide new horizon will open 
for Russia’s zemstva, demanding fresh urgent and loving work. Our readiness for such work 
is shown by the fifty-year history of our zemstva and by the great patriotic inspired 
enthusiasm of zemstvo Russia over the current unforgettable year’.49 
 
New horizons 
 
The zemstvo and municipal councils believed that they had unique and unparalleled 
characteristics that qualified them to play a central part in Russia’s war effort. Their initial 
focus on providing immediate care for the many men wounded in the battles in the first 
months of the war was soon extended to a much wider range of functions. Writing in early 
January 1915, L’vov declared that ‘the zemstvo union, initially intending to restrict its activity 
to the evacuation [of troops] has, by force of necessity, been drawn in to a whole range of 
measures, closely associated with military activity right at the front’.50 The two unions had 
envisaged their role as being to receive wounded men, once they had been transported away 
from the front by the army itself and then to evacuate them into the rear where they could be 
provided with proper medical treatment. But the inability of the war ministry to organise the 
initial transportation of the wounded from the battlefield meant that the zemstva and 
municipal councils very quickly became involved close to the front line. By 1 November 
1914, 30 of the 40 hospital trains that the zemstvo union had equipped had been sent to the 
battlefront in East Prussia and Galicia. At the same time, the unions realised that they needed 
to be able to provide complete care for the wounded as soon as they had arrived from the 
battlefield at first aid points. Detachments to provide immediate medical care and food for the 
wounded were despatched to the front, while it was also proposed that the unions should 
open hospitals at the initial first aid points for men who were so seriously wounded that they 
could not easily be moved.51 In the Caucasus, the entire responsibility for caring for the 
wounded fell upon the two unions: this posed especial difficulties, given the often isolated 
mountain locations of military units and the inadequate railway network in the region. The 
challenges posed to the unions’ work by the Caucasus front were sufficient for L’vov to 
address the issues directly in early February 1915: he discussed the problems posed by the 
Caucasus theatre of war, and noted that the zemstvo union was taking a range of measures, 
including developing a range of evacuation routes through the mountains, establishing 
feeding stations for the wounded and providing help for refugees who were trying to escape 
the war. ‘These’ declared L’vov ‘are our direct tasks, our direct responsibilities’.52 The extent 
of fighting in the Caucasus placed other stresses on the zemstvo union, as it needed to recruit 
additional staff to work in the area, and also required the establishment of a dispersal centre 
for the wounded in Rostov in southern Russia. The Caucasus continued to pose problems for 
the zemstvo union, given the rapidly changing nature of the war in the region, together with 
the difficulties for the zemstvo union involved in operating across such a large area.53 
 
49 Izvestiia, no. 10, 1 March 19015, p. 2-3. 
50 Izvestiia, no. 6-7, 1-15 January 1915, p. 1. 
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52 Izvestiia, no. 8, 1 February 1915, p. 1. 
53 Izvestiia, no. 10, 1 March 1915, pp. 36-9. 
 11 
 
The local government organisations quickly found that they not just needed to provide care 
for soldiers wounded on the battlefield, but also became responsible for the provision of 
general medical services to Russian troops. Early in 1915, a report by the Moscow regional 
military medical inspector noted that Moscow’s military hospitals were overflowing and that 
this was forcing men into the care of the zemstvo and municipal unions. More than a quarter 
of the soldiers in military hospitals were there for general medical treatment, rather than 
having been wounded in battle and only some 10 per cent of available hospital beds were 
actually occupied by the wounded. Substantial numbers of men required hospital treatment 
for sexually transmitted diseases, with 34 officers and 1,333 ordinary soldiers occupying 
almost a quarter of the available beds in the Moscow general military hospital. Prisoners of 
war took up almost another 40 per cent of the hospital’s beds, and this placed huge pressure 
on local government-run medical services. Hospitals run by the Moscow municipal 
administration were already having to cope with significant numbers of men with serious 
infectious diseases, such as typhus and dysentery, but Moscow’s mayor had notified the 
military administration that the hospitals would soon be full and that military hospitals would 
have to find space to treat men with infectious diseases arriving from evacuation hospitals 
close to the front.54 
 
The issue of how best to combat the spread of infectious diseases occupied the zemstva and 
municipal councils for significant periods during 1915. As winter had approached in late 
1914, the zemstvo believed that the onset of cold weather meant that gastro-intestinal disease 
would not be easily spread. There was, however, concern in Moscow  about the possibility of 
the spread of cholera, since the experience of the Russo-Turkish war in the 1870s had shown 
that around half of all hospital admissions during the conflict arose as a result of infectious 
disease.55 L’vov addressed the question during February 1915, when he noted that each battle 
front presented different problems in terms of the challenge of dealing with infectious 
diseases. The large numbers of soldiers and intense fighting on the western front made it 
difficult to provide adequate food and clean drinking water for the army: a lack of clean 
water could easily lead to stomach disorders and the evacuation of sick soldiers, making it 
even easier for infectious disease to spread. In the Caucasus, Turkish prisoners of war, L’vov 
argued, had brought infectious diseases into zemstvo hospitals. He was especially concerned 
that infection could spread from the army into the civilian population: he noted that typhoid 
fever was already evident on the western front, with spotted typhus in the Caucasus. The 
broader health issues encountered in Galicia also concerned L’vov: there was a particular 
lack of clean drinking water and proper sanitation in the region, and the zemstvo needed to 
enforce proper sanitary and hygiene standards at its evacuation transfer points in Galicia. 
When the Union of Towns met in mid-February 1915, the central item on its agenda was 
discussion of the need to deal with infectious disease. Mikhail Chelnokov, the union’s 
chairman, noted that these diseases were an inevitable accompaniment to war, but that they 
presented an especial threat to Russia, given the long history of epidemics that the country 
had endured. For Chelnokov, this was evidence that the two unions needed to take their work 
even closer to the front line to support the maintenance of good public health.56 Local 
government, with its experience of managing public health, had to take the lead in planning 
to cope with infectious diseases.  
 
 
54 TsGAM, f. 179, op. 3, d. 48, ll. 1-2. 
55 TsGAM, f. 179, op. 60, d. 770, ll. 60-1. 
56 RGVIA, f. 12593, d. 6, ll. 9-17. 
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When L’vov met Nicholas II at the end of March 1915, he reported to the Tsar on the zemstvo 
union’s readiness to tackle the problem of infectious diseases; this had formed a major part of 
the discussion at the meeting of zemstvo representatives held earlier in the month.57 The 
meeting heard reports from zemstvo representatives stationed at the battlefront about the 
situation: on the Warsaw front there were significant issues surrounding drinking water 
quality, along with contamination from poorly situated graves for soldiers who had perished 
during the fighting. With the coming of spring, zemstvo representatives foresaw the danger of 
outbreaks of cholera, typhus, dysentery and other gastro-intestinal diseases: the provision of 
clean drinking water to the army was essential to avoid large-scale illness among Russia’s 
fighting men.58 It was also essential to improve the wider environment in which the army was 
operating: the zemstvo noted the collapse of rubbish collection services in most towns and 
villages in the region and the risks this posed to public health and the army. It was essential to 
reinstate rubbish collections and to take decisive measures to protect the wellbeing of the 
troops.  
 
The position of Galicia was seen as especially dangerous as, alongside the difficulties that 
were being experienced on the north western front, ‘Galicia has always been considered 
unpropitious in regard to outbreaks of all types of epidemic disease’. The zemstvo 
representatives noted that ‘now that almost the whole country has become the scene of 
military action, when the majority of the population has lost not just bread, but also blood, the 
danger of outbreaks of epidemic diseases has become almost inevitable’.59 The zemstvo 
representatives working in Galicia recognised the steps that both the military and local 
government were taking and hoped that it would be possible to revive the medical services 
that the Galician population had received before the war: the zemstvo would be able to work 
together with existing structures to improve healthcare. In the interim, however, the zemstvo 
could take additional steps to counter the spread of disease: it was important to improve the 
condition of the evacuation stations for wounded soldiers: healthy and sick men were 
constantly passing through these stations, giving the opportunity for infection to spread. The 
zemstvo argued that they must organise baths, disinfection facilities and water boilers at 
evacuation stations, as well as providing medical inspection of soldiers’ barracks at the 
evacuation stations. The sum of 48,000 rubles was allocated to the provision of bathhouses 
and laundries, with a additional 25,000 rubles each month for running costs.60 
 
The final component of the zemstvo campaign to contain the spread of disease in Galicia was 
to set up large isolation hospitals at railway stations on the borders of Galicia where soldiers 
being evacuated to the rear could receive full medical examination and be isolated in case of 
disease. The zemstvo union envisaged four isolation hospitals being set up, with up to 2,000 
beds each so that soldiers suffering from infectious diseases were not evacuated further 
east.61 Prisoners of war also presented problems for local government attempts to contain the 
spread of disease. Early in 1915, an outbreak of typhus occurred among Turkish prisoners 
who had been sent to Kaluga after being captured in the Caucasus: the only zemstvo hospital 
in Kaluga became filled with ill Turkish prisoners and, to accommodate then, the sexually 
transmitted disease ward in the hospital had to closed and patients sent home. Temporary 
hospitals had to be established to cope with the sick prisoners, and only then could the 
zemstvo hospital again admit local people as patients. In addition, the Kaluga provincial 
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zemstvo had to rent bathhouses solely for the prisoners of war, since bathhouse owners would 
not otherwise allow prisoners to use them.62 
 
The need for the zemstvo and municipal unions to provide medical services, not just to the 
wounded, but potentially to people suffering from a wide range of diseases, placed strains 
upon their ability to recruit sufficient staff. It was especially difficult to attract doctors, and 
by March 1915 the zemstvo union was only able to recruit two thirds of the number of 
medical staff it needed.63 The system of exemptions from military service also produced 
problems for the zemstvo and municipal unions: while Red Cross doctors and the medical 
staff of existing large zemstvo hospitals could claim exemption from military service, other 
doctors did not qualify and while the zemstvo union received more than 1,600 applications 
from doctors to work in its units, the exemption rules means that it had been able to accept 
fewer then 300 of them.64  
 
Combatting infectious disease showed the zemstvo and municipal unions the extent of the 
tasks that faced them in supporting Russia’s war effort and the continuing weakness of the 
war ministry in anticipating the consequences of the war. There was, however, a political 
dimension to the unions’ ambition to extend their activity: after half a century of being 
excluded from work on a national scale, the unions were determined not to lose the 
opportunity that had been presented to them by the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914. 
L’vov was very keen to stress in March 1915 that a united national effort was needed to deal 
with the threat of widespread disease, evidently fearing that the zemstvo and municipal 
unions could be side-lined by national government. Unity, L’vov suggested, was the natural 
outcome of nine months of war and, in any case, as the unions would continue to have the 
responsibility of caring for the wounded who had contracted infectious diseases, it was 
appropriate for them to take a central part in the work nationally.65 
 
The zemstvo and municipal unions realised quickly that they needed to take responsibility for 
a wide range of other services as a consequence of their involvement with the wounded. A 
report to the Union of Towns in October 1914 had identified the extremely serious position of 
wounded men who had lost limbs and proposed that the union open a workshop to 
manufacture prosthetics.66 By the end of 1914, the Moscow city Duma had established a 
commission to deal with the provision of prosthetics and other assistance to soldiers who had 
lost limbs during the fighting; it drew up plans for establishing a workshop to manufacture 
prosthetics and contributed 10,000 rubles to the associated costs.67 Significant numbers of 
soldiers also suffered from severe mental health problems as a result of their experience of 
warfare: in February 1915 the two unions allocated 650,000 rubles to help provide for these 
men.68 
 
The unions recognised that, as well as requiring basic equipment such as surgical 
instruments, for their evacuation trains and hospitals they needed to provide everything that 
wounded troops required while they were receiving medical treatment. As autumn arrived, 
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warm clothing and footwear were a priority for the unions, along with bed linen and soap.69 
The zemstvo union agreed to purchase 40,000 warm winter coats, 50,000 fur hats and 40,000 
pairs of winter footwear. These items were expensive and the Moscow military commander 
was requested to contribute 50,000 rubles to provide clothing for ordinary soldiers as they left 
hospital, while the zemstvo union estimated that supplying 40,000 wounded men with basic 
supplies  - bedding, towel, slippers and socks - while they were in hospital would cost 1.3m 
rubles.70 Procuring these supplies also presented a challenge for the unions, since the Russian 
textile industry was giving priority to producing uniforms for front-line troops and the 
possibility of importing the necessary supplies was severely limited by restrictions on both 
the availability of foreign currency and the limitations on trade as a result of the closing of 
much of Russia’s western land frontier. By the beginning of 1915, the zemstvo union was 
employing 15,000 soldier’s wives to make clothes for the wounded, as well as to provide 
supplies to the army itself. By 1 January 1915 the zemstvo workshops had manufactured 2.5m 
shirts and 1.8m sets of underwear, with a further 600,000 shirts and 1.1m sets of underwear 
ready to be completed.71 Individual zemstva and municipal councils also contributed clothing: 
Tver provided 3,000 sets of clothing, with Tula producing clothing for both the wounded and 
soldiers at the front. The Tver provincial zemstvo also requested an advance of 300,000 
rubles from the national union to buy material to make boots for troops; rapidly rising prices 
meant that the zemstvo wanted to buy leather immediately.72 The Vologda zemstvo organised 
the sewing of linen for the wounded, producing more than 7,400 items between September 
1914 and January 1915, while the Viatka zemstvo board provided 100,000 pairs of warm 
woollen leggings and more than 555,000 pud of grain to the army itself. In Perm, the 
provincial zemstvo organised a women’s sewing circle to produce linen for zemstvo hospitals: 
more than 17,000 pieces of clothing and linen had been supplied by February 1915.73 The 
Novgorod zemstvo also established a women’s committee but, instead of sewing linen 
themselves, they raised funds for a disinfection station for clothing and bedding.74  
 
It was not just material for the soldiers themselves that the zemstvo union needed to procure: 
at a meeting in the city of L’viv on 19 January 1915, representatives of the zemstvo and 
municipal unions met the Red Cross and agreed to procure 15,000 pud of hay and 15 wagons 
of oats for the unions’ use. The zemstvo union also needed to purchase horses for its work, a 
task that was made difficult by the priority given to the war ministry in requisitioning horses 
for the army’s use. Horses were only available for purchase by private organisations in a few 
districts of the Russian empire, and during 1915 the zemstvo union needed to procure an 
average of 1,500 horses each month and transport them from far-flung corners of the empire 
to the front.75  
 
The zemstvo and municipal councils also provided assistance to families where men had been 
conscripted into the army. The Perm provincial zemstvo reported in March 1915 that some 
100,000 families in the province had seen men being recruited for military service, with 
60,000 now needing assistance with agricultural work.76 In February 1915, the Bessarabia 
provincial zemstvo board set up a charitable committee to support the conscripts’ families, 
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allocating 34,000 rubles to support its work, while the Saratov zemstvo committee had agreed 
at its first meeting in August 1914 to provide support for wounded soldiers’ families until a 
solider had recovered completely from his injuries, and the Ostrogozhskii district zemstvo 
committee in Voronezh province established 29 local committees to provide help to soldiers’ 
families.77 Moscow’s provincial zemstvo allocated 150,000 rubles at a meeting in February 
1915 to provide additional assistance to conscripts’ families.78 The need to offer support to 
conscripts’ families had been discussed in the first months of the war, when L’vov had noted 
that public organisations must be agile and ready to deal with any eventuality.79 The zemstvo 
and municipal councils recognised that, even though conscripts’ families were entitled to 
support from the government, they were likely to need additional food rations and that this 
could pose significant financial challenges to local government. By the end of 1914, it was 
clear that the war would not come to a rapid conclusion and that the finances of the zemstvo 
and municipal councils would be stretched by the calls on their resources.80 The Tsarist 
regime, was, however, extremely reluctant to allow local government organisations to stray 
outside their areas of responsibility as set out in law. The Ministry of Internal Affairs wrote to 
M. Brianksii, chairman of the Union of Towns, in September 1914 permitting the union to 
hold a congress, but insisting that it must not discuss any areas that lay outside its 
competence, including aid to soldiers’ families and the issues of food supply to Russia’s 
cities.81  
 
Conclusion: autonomy and tension 
 
Despite approbation at the highest level for the work of local government institutions, the 
Tsarist government retained a deep suspicion of their activities, believing that the zemstva 
and municipal councils were seeking to take advantage of the war to extend their own 
powers. At the same time, on a local level, the regime initiated surveillance of the staff of the 
unions’ hospital trains, seeing them as playing a part in the dissemination of revolutionary 
propaganda among soldiers. In December 1914, the Department of Police in the Caucasus 
requested information on the entire staff of the trains operating in its region from local 
gendarme units.82 The government while, however, recognising the threats that the work of 
local government could pose to its own authority on both the national and local levels, was 
reliant on the work of the zemstva and municipal councils to provide essential parts of 
Russia’s war effort. The exigencies of the war, even during a period of relative calm on the 
battlefield after the initial military disasters in East Prussia, meant that the government was 
powerless to prevent the Unions of Zemstva and Towns expanding their activities away from 
simply caring for sick and wounded soldiers so that, by early in 1915, local government 
organisations had gained a significant foothold in wider work both close to the battlefront and 
in the rear. Ordinary Russian soldiers and their officers reacted to the work of the zemstva 
and municipal councils with gratitude and enthusiasm, and this everyday contact with the 
Russian population was an important means of enhancing the position and image of local 
government among the army. The activities of the unions in providing basic services to the 
army and, increasingly to a wider segment of Russian society, were essential in positioning 
them not just, as adjuncts to the army and war ministry, but as autonomous bodies which 
could stand independent of the Tsarist regime and which identified themselves with Russia’s 
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people. When the Duma met for a brief three-day session at the end of January 1915, the 
rhetoric was still universally pitched towards maintaining national unity and the budget was 
passed without opposition.83 There was as yet then little sign of overt opposition to the 
government from the zemstva and municipal councils, but the renewed failure of Russia’s 
army in the Great Retreat during the summer of 1915 was to fundamentally change the 
national political landscape. 
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